How To Make Threat Modeling Work For You

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What is threat modeling?

Something we all do in our personal lives …
... when we lock our doors to our house
... when we lock the windows
... when we lock the doors to our car
We threat model by thinking ahead of what could go wrong and acting accordingly

What is threat modeling?

Threat modeling is the process of understanding your system and potential threats against your system.
A threat model helps you assess the probability, potential harm, and priority of threats.
Based on the model you can try to minimize or eradicate the threats.
Michael Howard  @michael_howard  Jan 7, 2015
A dev team with an awesome, complete and accurate threat model gets my admiration and not much of my time because they don’t need it! 😊

Brook Schoenfield  @BrkSchoenfield  June 29, 2015
As I practice it, threat modeling cannot be the province of a tech elite. It is best owned by all of a development team.
Threat modeling helps you …

Identify threats your system faces

Challenge assumptions

Prioritize other security efforts (pen test, review, fuzzing)

Document what you have learned

Definitions

Threat Agent

Someone (or a process) who could do harm to a system (also adversary or attacker)
Definitions

Threat
An adversary’s goal

Definitions

Vulnerability
A flaw in the system that could help a threat agent realize a threat

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Definitions

Attack
When a motivated and sufficiently skilled threat agent takes advantage of a vulnerability

Definitions

Asset
Something of value to valid users and adversaries alike
When?

Make threat modeling part of your secure software and architecture design

What if I didn’t? It’s not too late to start threat modeling, but it will be more difficult to change major design decisions

Getting started

Gather documentation (requirements, high-level design, detailed design, etc.)

Gather your team (don’t make this one person’s job only!)
  Developers, QA, Architects, Project Managers, Business Stakeholders

Understand business goals

Understand technical goals

Agree on meeting date(s) and time(s)

Plan on 1-2 hours at a time spread over a week or weeks – keep sessions focused

**Important:** Be honest, leave ego at the door, no blaming!
Threat Modeling Process – Making it work

1. Draw your picture - model the system
2. List the elements – entities, processes, data, data flows
3. Identity the threats - Ask questions
4. Determine mitigations and risks
5. Follow through

Draw your picture
Model the system

- DFD – Data Flow Diagrams (from Microsoft SDL)

Model the System

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Your threat model now consists of …

1. Diagram / visual model of your system
Identity the elements

External Entities:
Users, Admin

Processes:
Service, Authn Engine, Audit Engine, Mnmgt Tool

Data Store(s):
Data Files, Credentials

Data Flows:
Users <-> Service
Admin <-> Audit Engine

Your threat model now consists of …

1. Diagram / visual model of your system
2. Elements of your system and the interactions
Identify threats

Attack Trees (Bruce Schneier - Slide deck)
Threat Libraries (CAPEC, OWASP Top 10, SANS Top 25)
Checklists (ex: OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS), OWASP Proactive Controls 2016))
Use Cases / Misuse Cases
Games: Elevation of Privilege (EoP), OWASP Cornucopia
STRIDE
P.A.S.T.A. – Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis (combining STRIDE + Attacks + Risk Analyses)

OWASP Cornucopia

Suits:
Data validation and encoding
Authentication
Session Management
Authorization
Cryptography
Cornucopia
13 cards per suit, 2 Jokers
Play a round, highest value wins
STRIDE Framework* for finding threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Property we want</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spoofing</td>
<td>Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampering</td>
<td>Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repudiation</td>
<td>Non-repudiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Disclosure</td>
<td>Confidentiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial of Service</td>
<td>Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevation of Privilege</td>
<td>Authorization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Framework, not classification scheme. STRIDE is a good framework, bad taxonomy
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Identify Threats

- Input and data validation
- Authentication
- Authorization
- Configuration management
- Sensitive data
- Session management
- Cryptography
- Parameter manipulation
- Exception management
- Auditing and logging

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Ask questions

How is authentication handled?
What about authorization?
Are we sending data in the open?
Are we using cryptography properly?
Is there logging? What is stored?
Etc.

One of the best questions …

Is there anything that keeps you up at night worrying about this system?
Your threat model now consists of …

1. Diagram / visual model of your system
2. Elements of your system and the interactions
3. Threats identified through answers to questions

Determine mitigations and risks

• Mitigation Options:
  • Leave as-is
  • Remove from product
  • Remedy with technology countermeasure
  • Warn user

• What is the risk associated with the vulnerability?
Determine mitigations and risks

Risk Management

- Bug Bar (Critical / Important / Moderate / Low)
- FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information Risk) – Jack Jones
- Risk Rating (High, Medium, Low)

Risk Rating

Overall risk of the threat expressed in High, Medium, or Low.
Risk is product of two factors:
- Ease of exploitation
- Business impact
## Risk Rating – Ease of Exploitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **High**    | - Tools and exploits are readily available on the Internet or other locations  
              - Exploitation requires no specialized knowledge of the system and little or no programming skills  
              - Anonymous users can exploit the issue |
| **Medium**  | - Tools and exploits are available but need to be modified to work successfully  
              - Exploitation requires basic knowledge of the system and may require some programming skills  
              - User-level access may be a pre-condition |
| **Low**     | - Working tools or exploits are not readily available  
              - Exploitation requires in-depth knowledge of the system and/or may require strong programming skills  
              - User-level (or perhaps higher privilege) access may be one of a number of pre-conditions |

## Risk Rating – Business Impact

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Risk Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **High**    | - Administrator-level access (for arbitrary code execution through privilege escalation for instance) or disclosure of sensitive information  
              - Depending on the criticality of the system, some denial-of-service issues are considered high impact  
              - All or significant number of users affected  
              - Impact to brand or reputation |
| **Medium**  | - User-level access with no disclosure of sensitive information  
              - Depending on the criticality of the system, some denial-of-service issues are considered medium impact |
| **Low**     | - Disclosure of non-sensitive information, such as configuration details that may assist an attacker  
              - Failure to adhere to recommended best practices (which does not result in an immediately visible exploit) also falls into this bracket  
              - Low number of user affected |
Example – Medium Risk Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID - Risk</th>
<th>RT-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Lack of CSRF protection allows attackers to submit commands on behalf of users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description/Impact</td>
<td>Client applications could be subject to a CSRF attack where the attacker embeds commands in the client applications and uses it to submit commands to the server on behalf of the users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countermeasures</td>
<td>Per transaction codes (nonce), thresholds, event visibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components Affected</td>
<td>CO-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your threat model now consists of …

1. Diagram / visual model of your system
2. Elements of your system and the interactions
3. Threats identified through answers to questions
4. Mitigations and risks identified to deal with the threats
Follow through

Document what you found and decisions you make
File bugs or new requirements
Verify bugs fixed and new requirements implemented
Did we miss anything? Review again
Anything new? Review again

Your threat model now consists of …

1. Diagram / visual model of your system
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A living threat model!
Your challenge

Add threat modeling to your toolkit

Consider threat modeling first (secure design, before new features, etc.)

Many ways … just do it!

Resources - Books

Threat Modeling: Designing for Security
Adam Shostack

Brook S.E. Schoenfield

Risk Centric Threat Modeling: Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis
Marco Morana and Tony UcedaVelez

Measuring and Managing Information Risk: A FAIR Approach
Jack Jones and Jack Freund
Resources - Tools

Whiteboard
Visio (or equivalent) for diagraming
Word (or equivalent) or Excel (or equivalent) for documenting

Attack Trees – Bruce Schneier on Security
Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool 2016
Threat Modeler Tool 3.0
http://myappsecurity.com
Resources - Tools

Elevation of Privilege (EoP) Game

OWASP Cornucopia
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Cornucopia

OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS)

OWASP Proactive Controls (especially current 2016 work)
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Proactive_Controls

Questions?

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